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Criminal Law Consolidation (Mental Impairment) Amendment Bill – committee stage

In committee.

(Continued from 2 March 2017.)

Clause 5.

The Hon. K.L. VINCENT: I move:

Amendment No 1 [Vincent–1]—

Page 4, lines 20 and 21 [clause 5(5)]—Delete subclause (5)

As members would be aware, for some time the Dignity Party has held concerns about this particular aspect of the bill. While we understand the intent of it—and I do not want to go into this in any great detail, as I think we have had this discussion a number of times in this place—and while we understand the government’s intent is to make sure people cannot use the fact that they were intoxicated, either by alcohol or other drugs, as a defence to a crime, we are also concerned that this could adversely affect people with existing mental health conditions.

For example, let us say someone has pre-existing schizophrenia—without wanting to demonise any particular condition, just hypothetically—and they are under distress and lose control of their actions temporarily because they experience an active episode, so to speak, of their schizophrenia and they commit an offence.

If that person had had some alcohol or had even a small amount of drug in their system at that point in time, it is my understanding that they would lose, completely, the ability to say that they were not in complete control of their own actions at that time because of the fact that they were partially intoxicated, whether or not that alcohol or that drug was actually the cause of that offence. Our concern is that this could adversely affect people who may have real, legitimate existing mental health conditions. They need to have the opportunity to use that as a defence if that is the primary reason for them not being in control of their actions at that point in time.

I make it very clear that this is not about just anyone being able to say, ‘I was drunk or intoxicated or under the influence, therefore I can’t be proven guilty.’ We are simply concerned about the people who have an existing condition, where the alcohol or the drug is not the primary cause for their action or their committing the offence, and therefore we would like to see this particular part of the bill removed.

We understand where the numbers lie at this point in time, and we understand that the Hon. Mr McLachlan, on behalf of the Liberal opposition, has moved a compromise amendment to say that a defence should only exist if they can say that the person was substantially impacted by the alcohol or drug. We will support that in the event that striking the defence out altogether does not eventuate. However, we urge members to see reason and see that while we understand the intent, we certainly do not want to see any people being able to use alcohol and intoxication as an excuse for a crime. I understand that there are people who could be adversely and unfairly affected by this move because of their legitimate and pre-existing mental health conditions.

While we can see where the numbers lie, and we are happy to accept something of a compromise with the Hon. Mr McLachlan’s amendment, we would encourage members to consider this very important issue and how this move could impact those people with existing mental health conditions. Also, of course, it is hard to know whether the mental illness—for example, schizophrenia, as I just talked about—has led the person to consuming an intoxicating substance.

For example, if you are already experiencing an active manifestation of your schizophrenia—I feel like I am picking on schizophrenia, but I am just using that as a hypothetical example—and you are already perhaps not as in control of your actions as you would be, there is an argument to say that you could be more likely to consume alcohol and other drugs than you might otherwise be.

This is a very nuanced issue, and I think we need to consider very carefully how the different nuances could impact adversely and unwittingly and very significantly on people with mental health issues in this state. With those few words—or not so few, as it turned out—I move the amendment standing in my name.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I thought I might just set out the Liberal Party’s position, which has been correctly articulated by the Hon. Kelly Vincent. We will not be supporting this amendment. We have great sympathy with the reasons behind the moving of the amendment, and we thank the Hon. Kelly Vincent for her contribution in the previous part of the committee stage, which drew to the attention of the Liberal Party the manifest unfairness that can arise from the application of this government initiative.

We have sought to, as described by the Hon. Kelly Vincent, put forward a compromise version, whilst taking into account the government’s views and the reasons the government has put forward these amendments. I will speak more on those in a minute, but I certainly do not push back on the reasoning. Where we differ is in the outcome and the execution of attempting to address situations which—while the government might dispute this—I think are unintended consequences which result in manifest unfairness and go beyond what should be an appropriate response by the state in any circumstances to self intoxication.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: The government opposes this amendment. This amendment and amendment No. 2 delete provisions designed to implement the government’s commitment to stop offenders who are impaired by illegal substances or alcohol from using it as an excuse for their actions. For this reason, amendment Nos 1 and 2 are opposed.

As explained in the second reading speech, statistics collected from a case file review indicated that almost a quarter of offenders who successfully used the mental incompetence defence were suffering from an impairment caused by drug-induced psychosis or from some substance abuse and dependence. The bill therefore includes new provisions to stop offenders whose mental impairment was caused by self-induced intoxication from utilising the defence of mental incompetence in part 8A.

Instead, the person would be dealt with intoxication under provisions contained in part 8 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act. The Hon. Ms Vincent is seeking to remove these new provisions and to retain the current position, so that offenders who are impaired by illegal substances or alcohol can continue to use it as an excuse for their actions. These amendments, in the government’s view, are opposed for good reason.

The Hon. J.A. DARLEY: For the record, I will be opposing this amendment.

Amendment negatived; clause passed.

Clause 6.

The ACTING CHAIR ( Hon. T.T. Ngo ): The Hon. Kelly Vincent, are you still going ahead with your amendment No. 2 to clause 6?

The Hon. K.L. VINCENT: I am happy to see all my amendments as consequential.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I move:

Amendment No 1 [McLachlan–2]—

Page 5, line 37 [clause 6(3), inserted subsection (2)]—

Delete ’caused (either wholly or in part)’ and substitute ‘ substantially caused

As I indicated, the Liberal Party is seeking to accommodate the government’s agenda in this matter but at the same time seeking to blunt the more unintended consequences which have been teased out in the early part of the debate. We did originally intend to insert the word ‘substantially’, but we have taken counsel that substantially is a word—

The Hon. M.C. Parnell: ‘Significantly’.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: Sorry, we had ‘significantly’—the Hon. Mr Parnell is confusing me and messing with my mind—and we are now putting ‘substantially’ in because that is the word, we understand, that is more commonly used throughout the criminal law. That is the reason why we have filed a second set.

The circumstances have been well articulated in committee. It is our view that there has to be some nexus between the consumption of a drug or alcohol and then the prevention from using mental impairment as impacting the mens rea in a subsequent trial in response to charges on a particular criminal offence.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: The government is opposed to this amendment. The amendment is inconsistent with the government’s election commitment to prohibit anyone whose mental impairment was caused by self-induced intoxication from utilising the defence of mental incompetence. The government has consistently stated that this position is supported by the findings of the case file review conducted by the Sentencing Advisory Council, and it is for this reason that the amendment is opposed.

The Hon. J.A. DARLEY: For the record, I will oppose this amendment.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: The words in the bill as drafted I think potentially could have led to some very unjust outcomes. The words were that ‘the mental impairment at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence was caused either wholly or in part’. Those words are pretty unforgiving, especially the words ‘in part’. It means that only a small part of the mental intent needed to have been impacted by substance use for the defence of mental incompetence to be unavailable.

The Liberal amendment, on the other hand, uses the words ‘substantially caused’, so the mental impairment was substantially caused by self-induced intoxication. We similarly would have liked the word ‘significantly’, but if ‘substantially’ is a word that has more jurisprudence attached to it, then I think that works better, but it does soften the provision to make sure that those caught by it are those we want to be caught by it.

The people at whom this bill is really aimed are those who deliberately get themselves intoxicated and then try to rely on it to get out of their criminal responsibility. I think there is uniform agreement that we do not want that to happen, but there are areas of grey, and this is an area that I think has been improved by the honourable member’s amendment, so the Greens will support it.

The Hon. R.L. BROKENSHIRE: Family First has deliberated on the Hon. Andrew McLachlan’s amendments. We understand what he is trying to do, but we also understand what the government’s intent is here with this legislation, and we will not support this amendment and support the government bill as it stands.

The Hon. K.L. VINCENT: Without wanting to repeat myself too much (but then I say that and proceed to repeat myself) the Dignity Party does support the Hon. Mr McLachlan’s amendment. I think it does capture the intent of what we were trying to achieve with our amendment, and that is to make sure, as the Hon. Mr Parnell was saying, that we capture those people who deliberately go out, become intoxicated, do the wrong thing and try to use that deliberate intoxication as a defence to that offence.

We do not want to see people who are not substantially impacted by the substance they have imbibed, but might be affected by a pre-existing condition, not able to use that condition as a defence and therefore get the mental health support surrounding that that they might require. Certainly, as has been said, the wording of ‘in part’ or ‘wholly’ affected by intoxication is problematic, because you do not want to see a situation where someone might have a very minimal amount of some substance or another in their system, yet that is an insufficient amount to account for the offence, yet they lose the ability to claim any defence to that action.

I think the words ‘substantially affected’ or ‘substantially intoxicated’ do achieve that and therefore we are happy to support the amendment. Ultimately, to my mind, it does not matter whose name is on the amendment that passes this place; what matters is that we achieve the best outcome in terms of putting forward the best legislation for the people of this state.

I respectfully put it to the minister that this parliament is not here to legislate the government’s election promises: the parliament is here to achieve the best it can for our community and not unfairly impact certain sectors in our community in trying to do so. With all due respect to the minister, we are not here to legislate the government’s election promises. Perhaps if the government’s election promises were a bit more thought through, we would not be having this discussion. With those words, on behalf of the Dignity Party, I support the Hon. Mr McLachlan’s amendment.

The committee divided on the amendment:

Ayes10

Noes9

Majority1

AYES

Dawkins, J.S.L.

Franks, T.A.

Lee, J.S.

Lucas, R.I.

McLachlan, A.L. (teller)

Parnell, M.C.

Ridgway, D.W.

Stephens, T.J.

Vincent, K.L.

Wade, S.G.

 

 

NOES

Brokenshire, R.L.

Darley, J.A.

Gago, G.E.

Gazzola, J.M.

Hanson, J.E.

Hood, D.G.E.

Maher, K.J.

Malinauskas, P. (teller)

Ngo, T.T.

PAIRS

Lensink, J.M.A.

Hunter, I.K.

 

Amendment thus carried.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I move:

Amendment No 2 [McLachlan–2]—

Page 5, after line 41—Insert:

(3) However, despite the fact that the judge is satisfied that the person’s mental impairment at the time of the conduct alleged to give rise to the offence was substantially caused by self-induced intoxication, the judge may nevertheless make an order that the person be dealt with under this Part after taking into account—

(a) the time and circumstances of when and how the intoxication caused the mental impairment; and

(b) the interests of justice; and

(c) whether the making of such an order would affect public confidence in the administration of justice.

This has been drafted in an effort to ameliorate another significant injustice that was identified in the committee stage. I thank the honourable members for their contribution during that part of the debate.

Members interjecting:

The CHAIR: Honourable members, allow the Hon. Mr McLachlan to speak with the attention he deserves. Order!

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: Thank you, Mr Chair, for your protection. During the course of the debate, we identified that you could have a situation with the words ‘whether the intoxication occurred at the time of the relevant conduct’ that with mental impairment caused by, let us say, intoxication, even under age, then the mental impairment could not be relied upon in a subsequent response to criminal charges maybe up to 30 or 40 years later. It is the view of the Liberal Party that that is intolerable.

However, in taking advice from parliamentary counsel in considering how we could address the situation, the best way that we have been advised to deal with this is to insert a judicial discretion. I can anticipate that the government will be resisting this amendment based on the fact that the discretion is too unwieldy and that it allows too many options for the judges to undermine the intention of the legislation. I remind honourable members that, when it suits the government to have judicial discretion, it is the greatest thing on the planet, and when it does not suit the government, it is an unwieldy and inappropriate mechanism.

It is the view of the Liberal Party that the best remedy, or the best remedy that we can conceive, is to allow discretion where it is manifestly unfair. That is why I have raised the example given to us, which resulted in us attempting to conceive something that will address that situation that concerns us deeply.

The amendment allows the judge to take into account the time and circumstances of when the intoxication was caused, the interests of justice and the public confidence in the administration of justice. These are standard phrases. These are concepts which judges are accustomed to and regularly address in their judgements.

We do not think that the amendment is unwieldy and will result in an undermining of the government’s intention. In fact, in these circumstances, we are simply drawing the judge’s attention to circumstances where they need to make a judgement. This is particularly because I do not think the public would accept a judgement, in the circumstances I have described, where someone who is mentally impaired is proven to be mentally impaired, and therefore should not be tried but instead be treated in the circumstances when there might be a 30, 40 or even 50-year time differential between the circumstances causing the impairment, and in those 30 to 40 years have lived a blameless life suffering with their impairment.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: The government opposes this amendment. The insertion of this subsection defeats the whole intention of the clause and renders the government’s election commitment meaningless. For this reason, the amendment is strongly opposed.

The consequence of this amendment would be that a number of people, whom the government is trying to prohibit from utilising part 8A, could still be able to avail themselves of the defence, if a court made an order to that effect. The government submits that this amendment goes a lot further than addressing the opposed mischief in the bill that it appears to be addressing. The Hon. Mr McLachlan’s first amendment is sufficient to address members’ concerns about when the defence of mental impairment should and should not be available.

The government is concerned that this proposed amendment results in the court being asked to make a public policy decision about who is captured under part 8A and who is not. It is the parliament that should decide in what circumstances a person is able to rely on a defence in part 8A, not the judiciary. Also, this amendment does not promote consistency as to whom is entitled to a finding of not guilty due to mental impairment. By providing the judiciary with such a wide discretion, there is a real fear that the provision will never be applied consistently. As such, it would be very difficult, for example, for a defence counsel to provide evidence to their client as to whether or not the defence of mental impairment would be available to them. The government strongly opposes this amendment.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: I think the government protests too much when it says that this amendment defeats the intent of the clause. I do not see it like that. As I said earlier, there is overwhelming support for those situations where a person gets themselves drunk, for example, commits an offence and then tries to rely on the fact that they did not know what they were doing and therefore they should get off the charge. That is gone under this bill. I do not think it is coming back.

As members have pointed out, there are anomalies and there are areas where justice is best served by having a more nuanced approach. I accept that what the Hon. Andrew McLachlan says is if at the end of the day a judge decides that the interests of justice require a person to be dealt with under the mental competence provisions, then it should be possible for that to happen. I think it is going to be the exception rather than the rule. The rule is what we have created in this bill, and that is self-induced mental impairment is not going to be used as an excuse anymore. I do not think it fundamentally goes to the heart of it.

The Greens have consistently supported judicial discretion at nearly every opportunity where it has been presented to us. Whilst I can accept the minister says that this is a matter of policy and is a matter for the parliament to decide, I think we have decided the general policy in this bill, but the detailed application we can leave to judicial discretion.

One injustice that has come to my mind is that over the years, as the government has been pushing for mandatory minimum penalties, it may well be that a person who is deserving of some level of consideration or sympathy is simply not able to get it because if they are found guilty, then the minimum penalty will apply and there is nothing the judge can do about it, even if the interests of justice require a different outcome and even if the public is appalled at the harsh treatment that the person obtained.

This amendment does give the court the opportunity to look at these special cases and to decide, as the honourable member said, if the mental impairment caused by self-induced intoxication was perhaps decades earlier, that it is inappropriate to then suggest that that person is not able to rely on the mental competence provisions of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act for a lifetime. With those words, the Greens support this amendment.

The Hon. J.A. DARLEY: For the record, I oppose this amendment.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I briefly respond to the minister’s response. All the points that he raised were really a beautiful description of the development of the common law. Therefore, judges, since the common law has been developing, have been deciding matters as freely as the minister has outlined and so I see no fear, both from a normal operation of the court but also for the reasons articulated by the Hon. Mr Parnell. We have set the policy and we have, in addition to it, in certain circumstances, allowed judicial discretion.

The committee divided on the amendment:

Ayes10

Noes9

Majority1

AYES

Dawkins, J.S.L.

Franks, T.A.

Lee, J.S.

Lucas, R.I.

McLachlan, A.L. (teller)

Parnell, M.C.

Ridgway, D.W.

Stephens, T.J.

Vincent, K.L.

Wade, S.G.

 

 

NOES

Brokenshire, R.L.

Darley, J.A.

Gago, G.E.

Gazzola, J.M.

Hanson, J.E.

Hood, D.G.E.

Maher, K.J.

Malinauskas, P. (teller)

Ngo, T.T.

PAIRS

Lensink, J.M.A.

Hunter, I.K.

 

Amendment thus carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 7 to 10 passed.

Clause 11.

New section 269NDA.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 1 [Police–1]—

Page 9, after line 25— After inserted section 269ND insert:

269NDA—Revision of Division 3A orders

(1) If a person who has been released on licence under this Division contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence, the court by which the Division 3A order was made may, on application by the Crown (which may be made, in a case of urgency, by telephone), review the order.

(2) On an application for a review being made, the court may make an interim order in such terms as the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances, including an order that the person be detained in a specified place for a specified period pending the determination of the review.

(3) After allowing the Crown and the person subject to the order a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the application for review, the court may do 1 or more of the following:

(a) confirm the present terms of the Division 3A order;

(b) amend the order by varying the conditions of the licence;

(c) revoke the order and declare the defendant to be liable to supervision under Division 4 Subdivision 2;

(d) make any further order or direction that may be appropriate in the circumstances.

I start by setting out that the government’s amendments are the result of discussions between the government, the Hon. Mr Darley and the Hon. Ms Vincent. I thank those members for their collaborative approach to these discussions. This particular amendment provides that the Crown may make an urgent application, including by telephone, to have a division 3A order reviewed. Division 3A orders are part of the reforms included in this bill which provide more flexibility for courts of summary jurisdiction.

It is intended that this provision will be utilised by the court when it is being asked to review a person’s division 3A order at the end of a period of administrative detention. The amendment also provides that the court can make an interim order, including an order that the person be detained pending the determination of a review.

The Hon. J.A. DARLEY: I thank the minister for moving this amendment in response to concerns I raised about a lack of appeal provisions to administrative detention orders. This was coupled with concerns that there would be nothing to prevent a defendant being placed under successive administrative detention orders. Whilst I understand that this is not the intention, I wanted assurances that a person could not be indefinitely detained using administrative detention orders with no right of appeal.

I thank the Attorney for his cooperative approach on this matter and I support this amendment and, consequently, the government’s other amendments relating to this matter. Further, I want to thank the Attorney for moving this bill to limit circumstances when the mental impairment defence can be used, particularly for those who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol. This is a matter that I have spoken about before and, as some in this place may know, I had drafted a bill along the same lines.

I was prompted to draft my bill after meeting with Frances Nelson QC, the Chair of the Parole Board, who expressed concerns that the mental impairment defence was being misused and that these provisions needed to be tightened. However, my bill was constrained by the drafting and only affected a limited number of offences. I am pleased the Attorney-General has taken this matter on board and brought forward a bill where the effect of these changes will be much broader.

The Hon. A.L. McLACHLAN: I indicate to the chamber that the Liberal Party will be supporting these amendments and we thank the Hon. Mr Darley for bringing them to the attention of the chamber.

The Hon. M.C. PARNELL: The Greens will be supporting these amendments.

The Hon. K.L. VINCENT: I was only going to say, to just to complete the rainbow, that we support the amendment.

New section agreed to.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 2 [Police–1]—

P age 9, line 31 [clause 11, inserted section 269NE(1)]—

Delete ‘has breached, or is likely to breach, a condition of the order’ and substitute:

contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence

This amendment is simply a consequential amendment, which ensures consistency around terminology throughout the bill.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 3 [Police–1]—

P age 9, after line 42 [clause 11, inserted section 269NE]— After subsection (3) insert:

(4) The progress and circumstances of a person detained under an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as reasonably practicable after the person is so detained—

(a) to determine whether an application should be made to the court for a review of the Division 3A order to which the person is subject; and

(b) for any other purpose as the prescribed authority thinks fit in the circumstances.

(5) Despite subsection (1), a person who has been detained under an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since the expiry of the previous administrative detention order.

This amendment and some of the other government amendments comes about following discussions between the government and the Hon. Mr Darley. I would like to thank the Hon. Mr Darley for the way in which he and his staff have worked collaboratively with the government on the drafting and negotiation of this amendment. This amendment relates to a person who is subject to a division 3A order and provides that the progress and circumstances of a person detained under an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as practicable by the prescribed authority after the person is detained.

The intention of the addition of this provision is that this review will enable a determination to be made by the prescribed authority about whether an application needs to be made to the court to review the person’s original division 3A order before the person is automatically released back into the community after 14 days.

This amendment also provides that a person who is being detained pursuant to an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed. The intention of this subsection is to prevent a person from being continuously detained on back-to-back administrative detention orders if a decision has been made not to review the person’s original division 3A order, as it was never the intention of the legislation for a person to be detained for longer than 14 days without a court appearance. Put simply, this amendment provides additional protection to persons detained under administrative detention orders.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 12 to 16 passed.

Clause 17.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 4 [Police–1]—

P age 13, after line 8— Before subclause (1) insert:

(a1) Section 269P(1)—aft er ‘the Public Advocate’ insert ‘ , the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights

This amendment explicitly provides the power for the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights to have a legal standing to be heard in any applications to vary or revoke a supervision order pursuant to section 269P of the act. The commissioner has expressly requested this power, and, whilst it appears that section 269P of the act has been interpreted by the courts in a way that allows victims an opportunity to be heard on such application, this amendment provides clarification.

The Hon. J.A. DARLEY: I thank the minister for moving this amendment. I have long been an advocate for the rights of victims of crime and believe it is important for victims to have a voice. This voice often presents itself through the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights. This amendment gives the victims of crime commissioner the ability to make an application for a supervision order to be varied or revoked. This provides clarification that the victims of crime commissioner is a person with a proper interest in the matter.

I understand that there has been some conjecture in the judiciary as to whether the victims of crime commissioner—often representing or assisting the victim—is a person with a proper interest in the matter. This amendment will clarify the parliament’s intentions. I support this amendment and also support the government’s amendment No. 6, which entitles the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights to appear and be heard when applications are made for a continuing supervision order. I again thank the Attorney and his office for agreeing to move this amendment following discussions with my office.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Clauses 18 to 21 passed.

Clause 22.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 5 [Police–1]—

P age 14, after line 15— Before inserted subsection (2) insert:

(1a) On an application for a review being made, the court may make an interim order in such terms as the court thinks appropriate in the circumstances, including an order that the person be detained in a specified place for a specified period pending the determination of the review.

This amendment will provide the court with the power to make an interim order in such terms as the court thinks is appropriate, including that the person be detained while the court is determining an application to review a person’s supervision order at the end of a period of administrative detention.

Amendment carried, clause as amended passed.

Clause 23.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 6 [Police–1]—

P age 15, after line 17 [clause 23, inserted section 269UA(5)]— After paragraph (b) insert:

(ba) the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights;

This amendment provides the Commissioner for Victims’ Rights with the explicit right to be heard on application before the court for a continued supervision order.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 7 [Police–1]—

P age 17, lines 34 and 35 [clause 23, inserted section 269UE(1)]—

Delete ‘has breached, or is likely to breach, a condition of the order’ and substitute:

contravenes or is likely to contravene a condition of the licence

This amendment is a consequential amendment, which ensures consistency around terminology.

Amendment carried.

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS: I move:

Amendment No 8 [Police–1]—

P age 18, after line 8 [clause 23, inserted section 269UE]— After subsection (3) insert:

(4) The progress and circumstances of a person detained under an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as reasonably practicable after the person is so detained—

(a) to determine whether an application should be made to the court for a review of the supervision order or continuing supervision order to which the person is subject; and

(b) for any other purpose as the prescribed authority thinks fit in the circumstances.

(5) Despite subsection (1), a person who has been detained under an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed since the expiry of the previous administrative detention order.

This amendment relates to persons subject to supervision orders or continued supervision orders and provides that the progress and circumstances of a person detained pursuant to an administrative detention order must be reviewed as soon as practicable by the prescribed authority after the person is detained. The intention of the addition of this provision is that this review will enable a determination to be made by the prescribed authority about whether an application needs to be made to the court to review the person’s original supervision order or continuing supervision order before the person is automatically released back into the community after 14 days.

This amendment also provides that a person who has been detained pursuant to an administrative detention order cannot be detained under another such order unless a period of at least 14 days has elapsed. The intention of this subsection is to prevent a person from being continuously detained on back-to-back administrative detention orders if a decision has been made not to review the person’s original supervision order or continuing detention order, as it was never the intention of the legislation for a person to be detained for longer than 14 days without a court appearance.

Amendment carried; clause as amended passed.

Remaining clauses (24 to 29) and title passed.

Bill reported with amendment.

Third Reading

The Hon. P. MALINAUSKAS (Minister for Police, Minister for Correctional Services, Minister for Emergency Services, Minister for Road Safety) ( 17:31 :06 ): I move:

That this bill be now read a third time.

Bill read a third time and passed.

See full session on Hansard